Anti-Croat False Flag Operations

[Željko Zidarić]

UDBa Deadlier than the Soviet KGB

UDBa Ubija Hrvatsku
http://tvrtkodolic.bloger.hr/post/ud...u/6290814.aspx


Blame the Croats Ops

Australia - Croatian Six
In this atmosphere of terrorism mania during the 1970s Australia’s Croat community were looked upon as the bad guy.
We now know that the alleged Croatian terrorism on Australian soil was the work ofUDBa.
http://inavukic.com/tag/udba/
http://inavukic.com/2012/02/11/they-...ra-completely/
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL110...mastermind.htm
http://teamuzunovmedia.blogspot.ca/2...rust-asio.html
http://teamuzunovmedia.blogspot.ca/2...-canberra.html


Plant in the BBC
Mitja Mersol, currently an MP in Slovenia, who worked as an announcer for the BBC World Service during 1970’s. His UDBA codename: “Linguist”
http://inavukic.com/2012/03/30/spies...rated-the-bbc/


Sweden - Olaf Palme
There is no doubt it was ordered ordered and implemented by Zagreb udba in order to discredit the Croatian exile community which was building strong links within the Swedish left at the time. The Swedes themselves now believe this. Is it not ironic that the UDBA agent lives in Zagreb today - Zagreb and name of Croatia is still associated with the assassination!
http://daily.tportal.hr/106929/UDBA-...ssination.html
http://www.thelocal.se/31488/20110117/
http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/...id_590595.html
http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/svijet/...bu/209748.html
http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvat...je-ubio-Palmea

This assassination was maybe a follow-up this event
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miro_Bare%C5%A1i%C4%87


Canada + USA - Embassy Bombings 1965 and 1967
November 25, 1965 - Croatian nationalists bomb the Yugoslavian consulate in Toronto, Ontario.
29 Jan 1967 simultaneous bombing of Yugoslav missions in Washington, DC, Chicago, IL, San Francisco, CA, New York City, NY, Ottawa, Canada, and Toronto, Canada; the Washington bombing injured two embassy employees.

Statue of Liberty Bombing
1980 June 3: Bombing of the Statue of Liberty. At 7:30 pm, a time delayed explosive device detonated in the Statue of Liberty's Story Room. Detonated after business hours, the bomb did not injure anyone, but caused $18,000 in damage, destroying many of the exhibits. The room was sealed off and left unrepaired until the Statue of Liberty restoration project that began years later. FBI investigators believed the perpetrators were Croatian terrorists seeking independence for Croatia from Yugoslavia, though no arrests were made.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?ni...pg=4925,695378


JAT Flight 367
After a brief investigation, Yugoslav officials said separatists from a Croatian fascist movement, the Ustashi, planted the bomb. Then three years ago, two investigative journalists, Peter Hornung and Pavel Theiner, dug out newly obtained documents from the Czech Civil Aviation Authority. They said it was likely that the jet – a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 – was mistaken for an enemy aircraft as it attempted an emergency landing, and was shot down only 800 metres above the ground by a MiG fighter of the Czechoslovak air force.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAT_Flight_367
Woman who fell to earth: was air crash survivor's record just propaganda?
Too good to be true? Miracle woman who survived '33,000ft fall'
Article about crash



Did this "Terrorist Org" really exist?
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_...le.asp?id=4003


Infiltrating and assassinating
Most UDBA assassinations abroad followed a standard model. Yugoslav agents planted disinformation in emigrants circles in the West, to create confusion and in-fighting inside groups. Assassins would conduct surveillance, then kill the target, usually with gunshots at close range. UDBA killings were often very brutal, more brutal than needed to kill. In some cases, victims were killed with knives and stabbed dozens of times. In all cases, UDBA tried to portray killings as the result of squabbles among emigrants – a story which Western police and intelligence agencies, which seldom understood Yugoslav emigrant well, often accepted at face value.

See also
http://www.novine.ca/arhiva/2005/1009/scg.html
http://slashtheseats.com/rrpedia/UDBA




Serbian barred from Canada over alleged Soviet-era espionage
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/04...era-espionage/
http://www.torontosun.com/2012/04/21...s-canada-entry
http://thebigpetrovski.blogspot.ca/2...-udba-man.html


this article was released in "Slobodna Bosna" on 4th. Febr. 10 and was translated by dr. Tom Sunic.
http://www.45lines.com/45lines2/?tag=intelligence-agent
http://www.45lines.com/45lines2/?tag=udba&paged=3


http://www.scribd.com/doc/32581452/2...N-THE-COLD-WAR

http://www.irgamag.com/members.pl?pa...tancy_12072011

http://studiacroatica.blogspot.ca/20...vocateurs.html




Iza bombe u Berlinu stoji prepoznatljiv rukopis Udbe!
OBJAVA: 19.01.2011
http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/iza-b...-clanak-241174


ZAŠTIĆENI UDBAŠI
Spiegel tvrdi: Hrvatima u Njemačkoj još prijete - iz Zagreba
OBJAVA: 10.01.2011
http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/spieg...-clanak-237748



Petar Penava: Šefa hrvatske Udbe poslat ću na doživotnu robiju
Objavljeno 19.09.2011. u 23:51
http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrva...6/Default.aspx


Terrorist attacks attributed to Croatians
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/....y=8&sa=Search

[Željko Zidarić]

Sources:
Global Terrorism Database
Jahn Otto Johansen


>From _Time_, 8 Mar 93, p. 33:

Militants seeking independence for Croatia have struck inside the U.S.
in the past. In December 1975 Croatian nationalists were suspected
of planting a bomb in a luggage locker at [New York's] La Guardia
airport, killing 11 people and injuring 75. [Then describes '76
TWA hijacking ultimately resulting in one death.] In June 1980
Croatian ``freedom fighters'' detonated a bomb inside the museum
at the Statue of Liberty, but no one was injured. All told, Croats
committed over 20 acts of terror in the US from 1976 through 1980.


an article in _National Review_, 5 Aug 83,
`Look Homeward, Terrorist (The Croatian Connection)'', by Richard Brookhiser.
It lists a bunch of small-scale, yet tragic acts that were directed
by ultra-nationalist Croats against more moderate Croatian emigres.


1962: Attack on Yugoslav consulate in Bad Goldberg, West Germany. Momcilo Popovic killed.

1963: Yugoslav citizen Andjelka Vuletina was killed by Ustasha terrorists.

1965: Andrija Klaric, Yugoslav consul in Munich wounded by an Ustasha assassin.

1966: Yugoslav consul in Stutgart Sava Milovanovic killed.

1966: A Yugoslav Stipe Medvedovic killed in Frankfurt.

1968: Ustashi bomb in cinema theater "20th October" in Belgrade. One person killed, 85 wounded.

1969: Leader of Yugoslav military corps mission in West Berlin Anton Kolendic and one member of the mission wounded by an Ustasha assassin.

1970: Yugoslav Niko Mijaljevic killed in Frankfurt.

1970-08-01 - Yugoslav Embassy in Brussels

1970-10-21 - Yugoslav Consulate Melbourne

1971-02-10 – Armed assault on Yugoslav Consulate Goeteborg Sweden. Three Yugoslav hostage were held.

1971-04-07 - Assassination attempt Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden - Stockholm - Total Number of Casualties 1 Fatalities / 2 Injured Yugoslav ambassador u Stocholm, Vladimir Rolovic, died from gun shot wounds by an Ustashi assassin. One administrator of the Embassy critically wounded.

1971-11-23 - Bombing of yugoslav travel agency in Sydney

1972-01-26 - Bombing Vienna-Zagreb Train

1972: A group of 19 armed Terrorist entered Yugoslavia. Thirteen Yugoslavs died and 19 were wounded in clashes with these terrorists.

1972: A bomb exploded in express train from Dortmund to Athens. One person was killed, eight wounded.

1972: Three Ustasha terrorists attempted to kill regional judge from Revensburg, related to the trial of five terrorists.

1972: Yugoslav Bozo Marinac was killed in Solingen.

1972-01-26 - Bombing Yugoslave airliner in Sweden - Total Number of Casualties 26 Fatalities - A bomb exploded in a Yugoslav Airline (JAT) plane flying from Kopenhagen to Zagreb. Twenty six people died.

1972-03-29 - Bombing yougotoura (yugoslav travel agency) in Sweden

1972-06-15 - Bombing yugoslav consulate in Munich

1972-09-15 - Hijacking of Scandinavian Airlines plan in Gateborg Sweden. Three hijackers asked for $105000 - A Swedish airline SAS airplane was hijacked on a domestic flight. Hijackers demanded larger sum of money and release of ambassador Rolovic assassin. Their demands were met.

1972-09-17 - Bombing of yugoslav Tourist Office in Brisbane Australia by Croatian Nationalists

1972-12-06 - Bombing Yugoslav Tourist Office in Milan Italy - no injuries

1975-03-30 - Assasination of unk, Vice Counsul (Yugoslav) in Lyon France by Croatian Nationalists - Yugoslav vice consul in Lion, France, Mladen Djokovic, was critically wounded by an Ustasha assassin.

1975-06-23 - Bombing Yugoslav Misson to the U.N. BYC

1975-12-24 - Bombing Yugoslav Airlines Office (Yugoslav Aero Transport) in Stuttgart Germany - A bomb exploded in a JAT office in Stuttgart, as well as in other offices of Yugoslav companies in Western Europe.

1975-12-29 Assasination attempt on Yugoslav Consul, Chicago - one person injured

1976: Five Ustasha terrorists hijacked an American TWA airplane. One American police officer was killed, and two wounded. HIC - Jutarnji



1976: A bomb exploded in front of Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, D.C. Two persons wounded.

1976: A bomb exploded in Yugoslav General Consulate in Melburn, Australia. Six- teen Australian citizens were wounded.

1976-01-03 - Bombing Yugoslav Consulate in Stuttgart - A bomb exploded in front of the garage of Yugoslav General Consulate in Stutgart.

1976-02-07 – Assassination of Edvin Zdovc, Vice Consul, Frankfurt Germany

1976-06-07 - Assassination Uruguayan ambassador to Paraguay in Asuncion Paraguay

From New York Times Index, 1976, entry on Croatia:

Gunman shouting `free Croatia' shoots Uruguay Amb[assador] to Paraguay
in Asuncion, apparently mistaking him for Yugoslav Amb[assador] who
was scheduled to make public appearance [June 8, 1976, NYT]


1976-06-16 – Armed assault on U.S. Army depot, Ammunition in Meisau W Germany

1976-07-28 - Assassination attempt on Vladimir Topic Yugoslav vice consul, Dusseldorf

1976-09-10 - Bombing at Grand Central Station NYC

1977: Radomir Medic as United Nation mission in New York critically wounded in assassination attempt.

1978: Two Yugoslav immigrants Ante Cikoja killed in New York City .

1978: Other two Yugoslav immigrants critically wounded in an attack in New York City.

1978: Yugoslav Radimir Gazija was killed in Constanca.

1978-11-22 - Assassination of Krizan Brkic, and American tool and dye manufacturer of Croatian descent - Glendale, California

1979: Yugoslav Salih Mesinovic was killed in Frankfurt

1979-02-26 - Bombing - against Reverend Timothy Majic, who for many years, wrote for a Croatian-language newspaper published in Chicago

1979-12-04 - Bombing of travel agency, owned by Yugoslavian native in Astoria

1980-03-17 - Bombing of Trade Bank, Yugobank office in NYC - attributed to Croatian Freedom Fighters

1980-06-03 - Bombing of Yugoslav envoy in Washington DC

1980-06-04 - Bombing of Statue of Liberty by "Croatian Freedom Fighters"

1980-12-17 - Assasination - Home of Joseph Zaninovich (member of Los Angeles Board of Transportation* by Croatian Liberation Army

1981: A bomb exploded in front of Yugoslav Cultural Informative Center in Stutgart.

1981: A Ustasha group "Croatian National Resistance" sentenced in New York for a murder, blackmail and treat against Yugoslav immigrants.

1981: A group of Ustasha terrorists were arrested in Eden, Australija. They were ready to leave for Yugoslavia and execute terrorist attacks.

1981: In Switzerland and West Germany, eighteen Ustasha terrorists were arrested. They were found with large quantities of explosive and weapons.

1981-09-26 - Hijacking of Yugoslav-Airlines Boeing 707, domestic flight JAT - Dubrovnik-Zagreb

1981-10-19 - Assassination of Central heating engineer/member Croatian Autonomist Organ. Mate Kolick, 41 in Cachan France

1981-11-25 - Assasination of Journalist (exiled Croatian) Stjephan M in Zirndorf West Germany

1982-07-05 - Bombing of telephone booths in NYC

1983: A court in New York sentenced seven members of "Croatian National Resistance" to 20 to 40 year term for various terrorist attacks. [Two, possibly three, events not on the list]

1988-10-20 - Assassination of Nikolei Stedul by Croatian Movement for Statehood in Kirkcaldy UK

[Željko Zidarić]

Serbianna - Yugoslav Dissidents during the Cold War

By Carl Savich
July 3, 2007

Introduction: Dissent and Human Rights

During the Cold War, US foreign policy used Yugoslavia as a counterweight and proxy against the Soviet Union. The US gave economic, military, and diplomatic aid to Yugoslavia when Tito broke from the Soviet bloc in 1948. The US regarded Tito as a “statesman”, “world leader”, and “political giant” even though he could be seen as a “dictator” and Communist “strongman”. So long as he was a proxy of the US, human rights abuses in Yugoslavia were covered-up and suppressed and overlooked. Indeed, Yugoslavia was praised by the US for its human rights record. Political trials, arrests, imprisonment, and even assassinations, were overlooked, so long as Yugoslavia was of use to the US. Dissidents were ignored so long as Yugoslavia remained a US proxy and useful in the Cold War. Human rights were exploited and manipulated by US foreign policy during this period.

Yugoslav Dissidents: Milovan Djilas

There was widespread dissent during the Informbiro or Cominform period in Yugoslav history from 1948 to 1955. There was even dissent within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) itself. The Josip Broz Tito regime responded to this dissent by political “repression”, by arresting and imprisoning dissidents. Many “pro-Soviet” Yugoslav dissidents were arrested and sent to prisons and labor camps. In 1949, the Goli Otok prison camp was established in Yugoslavia, on Goli Otok Island. The prison camp at Goli Otok was set-up for the internment of "supporters of the Informbiro."

Milovan Djilas, one of the top Communist leaders of Yugoslavia, emerged as a Yugoslav dissident in the 1950s. He was one of the most prominent dissidents to be imprisoned by the Tito regime. In 1944, and again in 1948, he had been sent to the Soviet Union for discussions with Joseph Stalin on establishing and maintaining relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. He was seen as the eventual successor to Tito.

Djilas, although he remained a Communist, rejected the rigidity of Communist dogma. He founded a new journal, Nova Misao, "New Thought", in which he analyzed issues dealing with socialism and Communism from a critical standpoint. He called for greater democracy in the Yugoslav Communist Party in 19 articles he wrote for the Borba or Conflict, a Communist party publication from October, 1953 to January, 1954. Djilas wanted “real freedom” which precluded a one party Communist monopoly on political power in Yugoslavia. His appeals for democratization within Communist Yugoslavia met with opposition from Communist leaders within the government and party.

On January 17, 1954, Djilas’ expulsion from the Yugoslav government followed. He had been the second in command to Tito and had been the vice-president of Yugoslavia and was regarded as the heir-apparent. His expulsion resulted after a session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was convened in Belgrade from January 16 to 19, 1954, presided over by Tito. He subsequently was removed from all of his Communist Party positions. Djilas ultimately resigned from the Yugoslav Communist Party in April, 1954. Yugoslav Communist leaders opposed democratization because they did not want to be voted out of office or have their entrenched positions needlessly jeopardized by popular votes. Tito had no intention of relinquishing his control over the government of Yugoslavia. The regime sought to create a Communist Party monopoly, a “bureaucratic oligarchy” and had an “obsession with power”. Opposition and dissent would not be tolerated. Why would Tito voluntarily give up his leadership of Yugoslavia or put it in jeopardy or risk? Djilas had to go.


Liberalization in the Communist bloc increased in the early 1950s. In 1951, the Yugoslav economy was decentralized and in 1953 collectivization was abandoned. The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 resulted in a relaxation of tensions. Djilas emerged in this political climate of liberalization.

On December 24, 1954, Djilas wrote that his goal was "to escape from the unreal, abstract world of the 'elite' and 'chosen' men and to enter at last the real world of simple, hard-working people and ordinary human relationships."

In December, 1954, Djilas gave an interview to the New York Times in which he asserted that Yugoslavia was ruled by "reactionaries" and called for the creation of a second political party to oppose the Communist Party. Djilas, along with Vladimir Dedijer, was charged with engaging in hostile propaganda against the Yugoslav government. He was subsequently brought to trial and convicted and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The sentence was suspended.

Djilas was arrested again in 1955 and released on probation, He continued, however, to criticize the regime in foreign publications. In 1956, he was sentenced to three years in prison for his criticism of the Yugoslav government position on the Hungarian revolt. He continued to criticize the regime and supported the Hungarian revolt.

In 1957, while in prison, Djilas smuggled for publication in the West of The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, in which he argued that communism in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe was creating “a new class” or caste of Communist party elites who made up a rigid privileged party bureaucracy and hierarchy. The system was neither classless nor egalitarian.

On October 4, 1957, he was imprisoned for spreading hostile propaganda. He was sentenced to an additional seven years in prison for the “deliberate intent to compromise both socialism as an idea and the international worker’s movement” and for “seeking to undermine the peoples’ authority, defense, and economic power”. He was released on probation on January 21, 1961.

He was imprisoned again in April, 1962 for publishing Conversations with Stalin in which he was accused of “disclosing official secrets”. He was tried and convicted in a secret one-day trial and sentenced to five years in prison. He was also to serve the three years and eight months remaining on his earlier sentence for publishing The New Class. On December 31, 1966, Djilas was released from prison after serving more than half of his eight years and eight month prison sentence.

He was imprisoned by the Communist regime in the Sremska Mitrovica prison, which, ironically, was the same prison where he had been a prisoner under the Royalist Yugoslav government in the 1930s.

Yugoslav Dissidents: Mihajlo Mihajlov

Nikita S. Khrushchev sought closer Soviet ties to Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s following the death of Joseph Stalin. He initiated “a thaw” in relations with the West and with Yugoslavia in the 1950s, the “de-Stalinization” or “liberalization” program of reforms. Khrushchev’s reforms created an expectation of change and improvements in foreign relations and in domestic freedoms. On October 13, 1964, Khrushchev was removed from power and replaced by Leonid I. Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin, and Nikolai V. Podgorny who immediately began a “re-Stalinization” or a return to the rigidity of the pre-Khrushchev era.


Mihajlo Mihajlov was another prominent Yugoslav dissident during the Cold War. Mihajlov was a Serbian academic who visited Moscow in the summer of 1964, before the ouster of Khrushchev, when dissent and critical views were much more tolerated. Mihajlov planned to publish his three-part series, entitled “Moscow Summer 1964” in the Belgrade monthly Delo. Following the appearance of the articles, he was arrested on March 4, 1965, and the accusation was that he had “slandered” the “brotherly Soviet Union” and that his critical views represented a new form of Djilasism.” The Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, Aleksandr Puzanov, had protested to Tito about Mihajlov’s articles in a meeting he had with him.

Tito maintained a policy of “steering a middle course between East and West”. He played one superpower bloc off against the other. In this way, he was able maintain his freedom of action and to maintain political and economic stability and viability. According to Mihajlov, “Tito then enjoyed the U.S.’ full support”. Yugoslavia was perceived as an “ally” and “friend”, even a “client state”, of the US. US foreign policy saw Yugoslavia as a pawn that could be used as a counterweight against the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. Yugoslavia was a pawn, but a highly prized pawn for both the US and USSR. Tito was able to exploit the position of Yugoslavia as a buffer state between East and West to wring political, economic, and military concessions from both blocs.

Tito was erroneously seen as the man most responsible for destroying the Kremlin monopoly of the Communist Movement or bloc. US policy was so rigidly ideologically based that it neglected to see the fissures in the movement. Tito’s role in the founding of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries also magnified his prestige and stature not only in the US and the West, but in the Third World and with the developing countries.

On April 29, 1965, Mihajlov was tried in the Zadar District Court for “damaging the reputation of a foreign State” and for violating the Yugoslav Press Law by submitting an article for publication in a foreign journal or periodical. He had written that there had been camps or gulags for dissenters in the Soviet Union even in 1921 under V.I. Lenin. This was one of the major accusations made against him. The next day he was found guilty and sentenced to 9 months in prison. His sentence was subsequently suspended and he was put on probation.

In 1966, Mihajlov was again arrested, tried, and convicted and sentenced to 3 and-a-half years in prison for publishing an independent journal. On October 7, 1974, he was arrested again. On February 25, 1975, he was tried for disseminating “hostile propaganda”, convicted and sentenced to 7-and-a-half years in prison. In the fall of 1976, Kansas Senator Robert Dole arrived in Yugoslavia to visit him. His visit was denied by the Yugoslav government. Once he was allowed to leave in 1978 on May 25, an arrest warrant was issued for him in Yugoslavia and his citizenship was revoked. Ironically, Slobodan Milosevic reinstated his citizenship.

In the US, the Committee to Aid Democratic Dissidents in Yugoslavia (CADDY) was formed by Myron Kolatch, the editor of The New Leader, an anti-socialist, anti-communist US labor publication. The Committee was formed under the auspices of Democracy International at Freedom House. The Committee was chaired by Mihajlov, Djilas and Franjo Tudjman, which published a monthly bulletin which was printed and distributed by the AFL-CIO. The bulletin was edited by the Croat Rusko Matulic. According to Mihajlov, Tudjman was “not yet a fanatical nationalist”.



Assassinations in the US

During the Cold War, Yugoslav government agents operating in the US, Europe, and Australia, assassinated Yugoslav dissidents. Yugoslav UDBA or secret police agents killed opponents and critics of the Communist regime abroad.

UDBA, or Uprava drzavne bezbednosti/sigurnosti/varnosti. was the Yugoslav State Security Administration or Directorate or Secret Police. The UDBA emerged from OZNA, Organ Zastite Naroda Armije (Department for Protection of the People) was a security agency of the communist Yugoslavia formed on May 13, 1944 under the leadership of Aleksandar Rankovi?. Military intelligence was overseen by KOS (Kontraobavjestajna sluzba), the Counterintelligence Service of JNA, the Yugoslav National Army. UDBA was formed in 1946 and was responsible for Yugoslav internal state security until 1991. The UDBA targeted "domestic enemies", “right-wing bourgeois”, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnian Muslim, Albanian separatists, Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim religious leaders, former Ustasha officials, Serbian royalist Chetniks, members of the Cominform, separatists, and nationalists.

The FBI told Yugoslav dissident Mihajlo Mihajlov that the Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) planned to assassinate him in the US. The Tito regime had UDBA “liquidators” that assassinated perceived opponents of the regime in the US and the West. These assassinations were the Yugoslav version of “targeted killings” and were conducted in the US and in Western Europe.

In the US, Dragisa Kasikovic, the editor of the Serbian-American journal Sloboda-Liberty and his successor were suspected to have been assassinated by the UDBA. Dragisa Kasikovic was stabbed to death along with his nine-year-old step-daughter Ivanka Milosevic in Chicago, Illinois in 1977. The UDBA was also suspected in the following murders of prominent Serbian émigrés: Ratko Obradovic in Munich, West Germany in 1969, Sava Cubrilovic in Stockholm, Sweden in 1969, Jakov Ljotic in Munich, Germany in 1974, Boro Blagojevic in Brussels, Belgium in 1975, Miodrag Boskovic in Brussels in 1976, Dusan Sedlar in Dusseldorf, West Germany in 1980, and Petar Valic in 1975.

Dragisa Kasikovic, an outspoken Serbian dissident, and his nine-year-old foster daughter, Ivanka Milosevic, were killed in the offices of the Serb National Defense in Chicago, Illinois on June 19, 1977. Dragisa was stabbed 64 times while Ivanka was stabbed 58 times. Members of the Serbian diaspora community in the US suspected that a Yugoslav secret police agent called Bogoje Panajtovic committed the murders. Yugoslav agents targeted editors and journalists from Serbian publications and media in the US, such as Vaskrs Srbije, Beli orao, Srpska borba, and Iskra. In addition to Dragisa Kasikovic, the Yugoslav secret service is suspected to have killed 27 other prominent Serb émigrés in the U.S., including Borislav Vasiljevic and Bogdan Mamula. In Canada, Rade Panic, Petar Manevic, Petar Kljajic were suspected of having been assassinated by Yugoslav agents.

In the 1950s, UDBA agents attempted to assassinate former Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic and Branimir Jelic. On April 9, 1957, UDBA agents are believed to have shot Pavelic twice in Argentina in an assassination attempt. Pavelic was wounded and transferred to Madrid, Spain where he is believed to have died from his injuries on December 28, 1959. One Croatian dissident was kidnapped while another attempt was unsuccessful.

In the 1960s, there were 20 assassinations of Croatian dissidents. There were four failed assassination attempts. The UDBA is believed to have kidnapped Ratline organizer and former Ustasha cleric Krunoslav Draganovic in Italy. Vjekoslav Maks Luburi? was believed to have been assassinated by an agent, Ilija Stanic, of the UDBA, the Yugoslav secret service, on April 20, 1969, after Stani? infiltrated Luburi?'s organization. Ilija Stani? was Luburi?'s godson, and the son of Luburi?'s comrade-in-arms, Vinko Stanic.

These assassinations came after Tito dismissed Alesandr Rankovic, the chief of the UDBA, in 1966 after the Fourth Plenary Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists on the island of Brioni on July 1, 1966. Tito focused his efforts on going after dissidents abroad while relaxing measures domestically.

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1966, the UDBA was reorganized as the State Security Service (SDB). The functions of the SDB were outlined as follows:

1) to act against the internal enemies of Yugoslavia;
2) to protect Yugoslavia from foreign intelligence services;
3) to act against anti-Yugoslav political émigrés;
4) to protect Yugoslav political and public officials;
5) to protect civil defense structures;
6) to engage in criminal prosecution;
7) to inform of any enemy activities against Yugoslavia.

In the 1970s, 28 Croat dissidents and émigrés were assassinated while 13 were unsuccessful. Yugoslav intelligence agents are suspected of assassinating Croat emigre Ante Bruno Busic, a militant Croatian separatist active in the Croatian Spring movement, on October 16, 1978 in Paris, France.

In the 1980s, 17 Croat dissidents were believed to have been assassinated by the UDBA. In all 67 Croatian, 12 Serbian, and 4 Albanian dissidents were believed to have been assassinated.

The income of the guest workers provided one third of the Yugoslav budget. The assassinations were meant to stifle dissent by going after editors and prominent leaders in the diaspora to induce censorship. During the 1970s and 1980s, more than 40 people were killed in West Germany by the UDBA. The CIA and the KGB killed less dissidents than Tito’s UDBA did in the West. Zeljko Raznatovic, known as Arkan, was one of the UDBA liquidators beginning in 1973. Arkan would later emerge as an ersatz Serbian “nationalist” and devout Orthodox Christian after the break-up of Yugoslavia, even though he spent most of his life as a Communist and atheist and anti-nationalist. Arkan was himself assassinated on January 15, 2000.

In 1995, former prisoners at the Goli Otok camp sought damages for their incarceration as political dissidents.


Anti-Communist Activities

Yugoslav dissidents in the US engaged in terrorist attacks against Yugoslav interests and targets in the US. Serbian dissident Dragisa Kasikovic admitted to a US federal grand jury that he had participated in the bombing of the Yugoslav Embassy in the US in 1967. He was imprisoned for not disclosing the names of his coconspirators in the bombing although he was granted immunity from prosecution.

Croatian terrorist attacks in the US were widespread during the Cold War. Croatian terrorism was based on ultra-nationalism and separatism, achieving an independent state of Croatia. On September 10, 1976, TWA flight 355 was hijacked by five Croatian nationalists, Zvonko Busic, his wife Julienne Eden Busic, Petar Matanic, Frane Pesut, and Marko Vlasic, shortly after it took off from New York's JFK airport bound for Chicago. They re-routed the flight to Paris, France, seizing 86 passengers. There were no weapons aboard the plane, but explosives were left behind in a Grand Central Station baggage locker. A 26 year old Bomb Squad Officer, Brian Murray, was killed while trying to deactivate the bomb.


Croatian immigrant Zvonko Busic, a Croatian ultra-nationalist and separatist, born in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was the lead hijacker, with his wife, Julienne Eden Busic, an American citizen, who was also on board. They were both sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after ten and eight years respectively. Julienne was paroled after 13 years, but Zvonko remains in federal prison in the maximum security prison at Terre Haute, Indiana. He was transferred there from the Leavenworth federal prison in Kansas.

He is regarded as a hero in Croatia for his Croatian ultra-nationalism and extremism. In 1987 he escaped from prison but was captured after a day on the run. He had been a member of Odpor, an extremist Croatian ultra-nationalist group, and demanded that leaflets advocating Croatian independence be distributed before they surrendered in 1976.

The five Croatian ultra-nationalists who hijacked TWA flight 355 were armed with modeling clay and electrical tape, from which they fashioned imitation explosive devices. They convinced the passengers and crew that they were prepared to die for their cause, the independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia. The airplane stopped in Newfoundland and Iceland en route to Paris, France, where the hijackers surrendered. They had placed the explosives in a locker at Grand Central Station to convince the authorities that the fake explosives on board the aircraft were real.

Zvonko Busic and Julienne Eden Busic were tried, and found guilty, and both sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after ten and eight years respectively a mandatory life in prison for "air piracy resulting in a death". While in prison after her conviction in the hijacking, she was struck with a hammer in 1979 by Lynette “Squeaky” Fromme, who was part of the Charles Manson Family and who was imprisoned for the assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford.

After Julienne was paroled she went to live in Croatia in 1995. She was a member of the Croatian Embassy in Washington, DC in the 1990s, immediately hired by the Croatian government after her release from prison. She was also a senior adviser in the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia after her release from prison. From a convicted hijacker and terrorist she was transformed into a Croatian diplomat. One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.

Julienne described the 1976 hijacking: “[W]e had no weapons, only a metal pot and some clay, which would later be used to fashion something that looked like a bomb.… My husband simply went into the cockpit and handed a note to the pilot, saying the plane was hijacked.”

Julienne Busic described the motive for the attack as frustration over the cooperation between Yugoslavia and the US: “The Yugoslav Secret police had been assassinating Croatian dissidents around the world, many of them our friends and even relatives. We were shot at twice, once in Berlin, and another time in Frankfurt. We moved to the United States and still the threats continued. All our legal attempts to bring the situation to the attention of the press and authorities failed. At the time, the U.S. and Yugoslavia were close allies and America was not interested in criticizing.”

Julienne Busic rationalized the reason for the terrorist hijacking: “[B]y 1976 I had became aware of the repression he, his family, and his people, the Croatians, lived under during Tito's reign, and so had to choose whether to violate man-made law in the service of a higher law, a natural law. I was acting this time on the basis of a fear that my husband would soon be murdered and also deep political beliefs that the criminality of the Tito regime had to be publicized and stopped before it was too late.”

The Croatian terrorist group was called the Croatian National Resistance, or Otpor or Odpor. It was founded by Vjekoslav “Maks” Luburic, a leader of the World War II Croatian NDH Ustasha government, which was allied with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

The group was active in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Cleveland, San Francisco, Toronto, Europe, and South America.

The Croatian Freedom Fighters (CFF) were motivated by the goal to achieve the “independence” of Croatia from Yugoslavia. The group was a separatist and secessionist group. They engaged in terrorist bombings and attacks in the US. The group attacked Yugoslav business and financial interests in the US and pro-Yugoslav Croats. In 1980, members of the CFF were suspected in the bombing of the Statue of Liberty.

On December 29, 1975, eleven people were killed in a bombing at LaGuardia airport in New York. Zvonko Busic is a suspect in this bombing, although he has denied any involvement in that case.

In 1987, Zvonko Busic, a leader of the CFF, escaped from his prison cell in Otisville, NY, but was quickly apprehended 2 days later after being caught sleeping behind a building 40 miles away.


Croatian terrorist attacks against Yugoslav targets in the US continued in the 1980s. On March 17, 1980, a bomb exploded at a Yugoslav bank office in a 30-floor office building in New York City, shattering the windows. No injuries were reported although the police reported several had been treated for shock. An anonymous male caller informed the FBI later that Croatian Freedom Fighters were responsible for placing the bomb. The caller directed agents to a Port Authority bus terminal locker where a letter was subsequently located. He said that the contents of the letter should be made public early that evening or two more bombs would be set off. The contents of the letter revealed the demands of the Croatian terrorists: "There will be coordinated actions by Croats at home and in emigration until Yugoslavia is destroyed and a free and independent Croatian state is established… [I]f even one Croat is delivered up to Yugoslavia or to any other country, Croats throughout the world will take action of unforeseen proportions."

On May 26, 1980, in San Pedro, California, a store and restaurant owned by two Americans of Yugoslavian origin were bombed. This bombing was reportedly by the Croatian Freedom Fighters. No injuries were sustained. One of the owners was supposedly a supporter of the Communist regime of Tito.

On June 4, 1980, a bomb exploded at the Washington, D.C., home of Vladimir Sindjelic, the charge d'affaires of Yugoslavia. The bomb was placed in a window box outside the sitting room. No one was injured in the explosion which caused damage to the structure. A group of Croatian nationalists, Croatian Freedom Fighters, claimed "full responsibility" for the bombing, which they explained, in a letter sent to the Washington Post, was a “sign of protest” against the Yugoslav Communist government because of its treatment of the Croatian movement's supporters.

In response to the UDBA assassinations, Croatian separatists targeted Yugoslav political leaders and officials abroad. Croatian ultra-nationalists and separatists have used terrorism and assassinations since at least 1971 against Yugoslav officials abroad. Croatian nationalists and separatists were involved in a series of assassination attempts in West Germany and Paraguay. At least 50 persons are believed to have been killed since 1972 in terrorist acts by Croatian separatists.

On January 23, 1981, in New York, a pipe bomb exploded in the sub-basement of the New York State Supreme Court Building in lower Manhattan, New York. The bombing halted trial sessions and forced over 2,000 employees, lawyers, and jurors, to evacuate the building. There were no reported injuries. The explosion damaged water pipes and shattered glass. A caller who identified himself as being a member of the Croatian Freedom Fighters, warned UPI that a bomb would explode "somewhere in the city." He did not reveal what structure was targeted for the bombing. The caller explained that his group was "protesting the American government's ignorance and approval of Yugoslavian persecution of Croatian dissidents." A Puerto Rican terrorist organization also later claimed responsibility for the bombing. Investigators said the Croatian terrorist group was most likely responsible for the bombing because of the type of explosive device used in the attack.


East-West relations: Yugoslavia and the US

US foreign policy during the Cold War consisted of using Yugoslavia as a bulwark or counterweight against the Soviet bloc. Both Democratic and Republican Administrations pursued the same policy of maintaining Yugoslavia as a buffer between the two superpower blocs.

In 1970, US President Richard M. Nixon went to Belgrade to meet with Tito in a landmark visit lasting from September 30, to October 2, 1970. Nixon went to Belgrade, Zagreb, and Kumrovec, the birthplace of Tito. Nixon was the first US president to visit Belgrade and Yugoslavia. Tito had visited the US for the first time in 1963 when he met with President John F. Kennedy on October 17, 1963.

Nixon’s 42-hour visit was seen as a reaction to the Brezhnev Doctrine that emerged following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslavia had voted against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia at the UN, although generally, Yugoslavia voted with the Communist or Soviet bloc on most issues. The Brezhnev Doctrine allowed the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of a Socialist/Communist country whose system was threatened by internal or external threats. This was seen by Yugoslav leaders as a possible threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. President Nixon indicated that while supporting the spirit of independence of individual Yugoslav nationalities, America remained a staunch friend of Yugoslavia as an integral federalist state.

At the October 1 dinner in Belgrade, Nixon announced what was called “the Nixon Doctrine”:

“...We do not accept doctrines by which one power purposes to abridge the right of other countries to shape their own destinies and to pursue their own legitimate interests. Every nation, large or small, has the duty to maintain its own security, but none has the right to do so by infringing the security of others.

You can be our friend without being anyone else's enemy.

The pursuit of total security by one nation can only lead to the insecurity of others, and therefore it will not bring order and peace.”

At that time Tito was concerned about what would happen to Yugoslavia when he left the political scene. A “fratricidal struggle” or “civil war” was foreseen among the Yugoslav nationalities and ethnic groups. If the US tried to benefit from the quarrels of the individual Yugoslav nationalities, pursuing a divide and conquer policy, a civil war would emerge in Yugoslavia. President Nixon assured Tito that the US had no goal of “dividing” the Yugoslav nationalities by supporting separatist and nationalist groups. In 1970, Croatia was the most volatile and separatist region of Yugoslavia.

Tito visited Zagreb on October 2, 1970, where he was welcomed by Jakov Blazevic, the President of the Croatian National Assembly. President Nixon extolled "the spirit of Croatia, which has never been destroyed or enslaved". Nixon concluded by supporting Croatia within the Yugoslav federation: "Croatia will always live! Yugoslavia will always live! Long live Croatia! Long live Yugoslavia!" Nixon thus supported Croatian nationalism, but as long as Croatia was within Yugoslavia. This was a subtle bit of diplomatic and political legerdemain. The US opposed an independent Croatia as Croatian nationalists and separatists demanded. The bottom line was: The US supported the unity of Yugoslavia as an integrated federalist state or federation and did not support Croatian or Albanian separatism, officially. The Tito regime saw Nixon’s statements as encouraging and supportive of Communist Yugoslavia, which was trying to prevent pressure from the USSR at that time. Yugoslavia was reacting to the Brezhnev doctrine, perceived as advancing Soviet hegemony, by drawing closer to the West while maintaining its independence and nonalignment and sovereignty.

Nixon explained the purpose of the visit: “No chief of state or head of government that I have met has had more experience all over the world and has known more government leaders around the world than President Tito.

It has been very helpful to me to get his appraisal of the various trouble spots in the world and his best advice as to what policies could be adopted which could lead to peace and cooperation throughout the world.

It has been for us a very worthwhile visit….

That is why I looked to a continuing discussion with President Tito on these problems in which he gives me his best judgment, and I, in return, share with him my thoughts on problems that we have. Because after all, despite differences in systems of government, we have common goals: peace in the world and the right of each nation, each people, to choose its own system of government without outside interference.”

In his last sentence, Nixon clearly was responding to the Brezhnev Doctrine.

On October 27, 1971, Tito visited the US for a second time from October 27 to November 2, 1971 when he met with Nixon. The issues on this visit were economic and trade issues.

In 1971, the Yugoslav trade deficit was $1 billion. Moreover, the US had passed rigid protectionist trade policies. In 1971, US-Yugoslav trade exchanges totaled $208. Yugoslav trade exports to the US could be doubled, but the duties imposed by the US would affect two-thirds of these exports. What the Yugoslav delegation, which included Kiro Gligorov, an economics expert from Macedonia, wanted was preferential trade treatment. The US planned a $300 aid package to Yugoslavia and extended the time for repayment of the $58.5 million Yugoslav debt. A new Import-Export loan was also agreed upon.

These measures were meant to stabilize Yugoslavia economically and politically. Donald Bostwick, the vice-chairman of the American Export-Import Bank, had gone to Belgrade to negotiate the promised loans to Yugoslavia. In conversations with Yugoslav Finance Secretary Janko Smole, Bostwick further assessed the financing of capital goods and equipment to be imported from the US. Bostwick anticipated that the Export-Import Bank would enter into fifteen credit arrangement projects with Yugoslavia, which would total $200 million.

President Richard Nixon emphasized that closer political and economic relations between the two countries were the goals of the meetings:

“I recall on the occasion of the visit that I made to your country---the privilege of being the first President of the United States to visit Yugoslavia---the long talks that we had, not only about relations between our two countries but about the problems of the world generally. I look forward to resuming those talks today and on the occasions that we will meet while you are here. I know that our discussions will further the interests of better relations between our two countries, but will also contribute to the goal of peace in the world, to which you are dedicated and to which we are dedicated.”

On August 3 and 4, President Gerald R. Ford made an official visit to Yugoslavia. On August 4, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford met Tito in Belgrade for discussions. President Ford reaffirmed “the steadfast interest” of the United States and its support for the independence, integrity, and nonaligned position of Yugoslavia. The US delegation consisted of President Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Dick Cheney, Deputy Assistant to the President. President Gerald Ford and Betty Ford were photographed leaving Surcin airport in Belgrade after the meeting and discussions with Tito.

During the 1970s era of détente between East and West, Yugoslavia cultivated diplomatic relations with both the Communist bloc nations and with the Western nations. In 1971, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev made an official visit to Belgrade where a declaration reaffirming the political independence of Yugoslavia was signed. The Soviet Union sought closer ties with Yugoslavia. In November, 1976, Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia again. In August, 1977, Tito visited Moscow on his way to an official state visit to China. The relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union remained stable in the 1970s. Relations between the two countries remained strained because the Soviet Union opposed the independent road to Communism which Tito espoused which splintered and divided the Communist bloc. They also had divergent views about the "crisis of capitalism" and the approach to take against "capitalist governments". The Soviets also opposed Euro-communism, which stressed that Communist parties in Western Europe should develop policies based on local conditions, not solely rely on policies of the Communist Party of the USSR. Euro-communism was based on the writings of Antonio Gramsci and was popular in Italy and Spain. The Soviet Union wanted Cuban leader Fidel Castro to lead the nonaligned movement because he was more pro-Soviet. At the 1979 meeting of the nonaligned countries in Havana, Cuba, Tito opposed Fidel Castro’s pro-Soviet position, preferring a neutral position with regard to the two blocs.

Tito met with President Jimmy Carter when he visited the US on March 7, 1978. President Carter focused on the close relations between the two countries: “He's a man who believes in human rights…There is a feeling of personal friendship and warmth and admiration that exists among the people of the United States toward this great leader and the land which he has guided.” At this meeting, the prior agreements between Yugoslavia and the US made with the Kennedy, Nixon and Ford administrations, were reaffirmed. The Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had propped up and kept Communist Yugoslavia afloat to advance US foreign policy objectives. The Carter administration re-emphasized the role Yugoslavia played as a buffer and counterweight in the Cold War.


Yugoslavia: Cold War Role

Both Republican and Democratic administrations manipulated and exploited Yugoslavia, a leading country of the nonaligned bloc of nations, as a buffer and counterweight between the US and Soviet blocs during the Cold War. As long as Yugoslavia could be of use as a client or proxy state of the US, human rights violations and assassinations were overlooked and permitted. Dissent was likewise exploited and manipulated by the US. When Yugoslavia was no longer of use to US foreign policy, the country was allowed to implode into secessionist and separatist civil wars based on ethnicity and nationality.

[Željko Zidarić]

16 January 2009

I remember the name Vesna Vulovic from the Guinness Book of Records as a child. Miraculously she survived a 33,000 feet (10km) fall and became (cue Roy Castle) a record breaker by surviving the highest fall without a parachute.

On January 26 1972 Vulovic was a flight attendant on JAT flight JU367 from Stockholm to Belgrade which exploded in mid air. The other 27 persons on board were killed. At the time the Yugoslav Government claimed that the explosion had been the work of Croatian nationalists.


However the official account has been challenged by two journalists who claim it was a fabrication by Communist authorities to cover up a mistake. According to Tuesday’s Guardian, Peter Hornung and Pavel Theiner, investigative journalists in Prague, JU367 was probably mistaken for an enemy aircraft and shot down by a Czechoslovakian air force fighter, causing it to fall and break up at a much lower height than previously believed.

Based on secret documents, mainly from the Czech civil aviation authority, unearthed after more than a year of research, Hornung said he did not believe the aircraft was blown up by Croatian nationalists. "It is extremely probable that the aircraft was shot down by mistake by the Czechoslovak air force, and in order to cover it up the secret police conceived the record plunge," he said. "No doubts have ever been expressed regarding the fall. The story was so good and so beautiful that no one thought to ask any questions."

Black boxes were never found.

According to an official version of events Vulovic had been in the tail section of the plane, even though eye witnesses have repeatedly said they found her in or around the middle, above the wings. She suffered a fractured skull, broken legs, and three broken vertebrae.

The new investigation says villagers from Srbská Kamenice, the Czechoslovakian village near the East German border where the JAT DC9 fell, reported having seen the plane intact but on fire below the clouds before it broke up. That and the small area of crash debris indicated the plane had disintegrated at around 800 metres. A second plane was also spotted.

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and his East German counterpart Erich Honecker were reportedly in the air at the time after a conference in Prague, supporting the theory that the DC9 was mistaken for a military threat to them.

Vulovic has no memory of the crash and can only recall boarding the Zagreb-bound flight before it took off in Copenhagen. When interviewed recently she said she would not be disappointed if the world record turned out not to be true. After recovering from her injuries she took a desk job at JAT, but she was fired from her job in 1990 after expressing opposition to Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic and taking part in rallies against his rule.



Vesna Vulovic in 2008

Vulovic, 59, lives in Belgrade and is still considered a heroine throughout the former Yugoslavia. She continues to have an active but low-key role in politics, protesting against Serb nationalism. In an interview with the New York Times last summer, she said: "I am like a cat ... I have had nine lives. But if nationalist forces in this country prevail, my heart will burst

I have no idea whether Hornung and Theiner have put on their tin foil hats or not but it is an interesting idea. More over I do admire Vulovic’s stance on nationalism. More of her sort might have consigned Milosevic to the dustbin of history sparing large parts of the former Yugoslavia years of death and destruction.

[Željko Zidarić]

Source: Taipei Times

AP , BELGRADE


For decades, the former Yugoslavia’s secret police recruited known criminals to kill Yugoslav dissidents who were living in other countries, a former agent said in an interview broadcast on Thursday.

The comment by Dusan Stupar, who led the spy agency in the 1980s, was the first time that a senior ex-intelligence officer has spoken about the alleged killings.

The Yugoslavian spy agency has long been suspected of ordering the execution of more than 70 mostly Croat, Kosovo Albanian and Serb emigres in Western countries between 1946 and 1990. During his rule, Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito often bred fear at home of external enemies of the state, branding its emigrants right-wing activists or terrorists.

Yugoslavia broke up as a nation in a bloody civil war in the 1990s.

Stupar told the B-92 TV station on Thursday that the late mobster-turned-warlord Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan was one of the hit men recruited by the secret police to kill emigrants considered enemies of the state.

Stupar said “Arkan and others carried out the tasks” for UDBA, the then secret service agency.

“They were very ‘patriotic’ and fought against the emigres even outside the agency ... in London, Germany or wherever they were,” Stupar said.

“As such, UDBA engaged them for certain tasks,” which included the assassinations, he said.

Arkan and his two bodyguards were shot to death in the lobby of a Belgrade hotel in 2000. He was under indictment by the UN tribunal in the Netherlands for war crimes when he was shot.

His killing triggered speculation that former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic — who died in 2006 while on trial at the UN war crimes tribunal in the Hague — was trying to silence a potential witness against him.



Stjepan Đureković

Stjepan Đureković (born in Petrovaradin in 1926 - died in 1983) was a Croatian businessman who was assassinated by the Yugoslav secret police, UDBA, after emigrating from Communist Yugoslavia to West Germany.

During World War II Đureković avoided service in the Independent State of Croatia's armed forces to join the Yugoslav Partisans.[1] After the war he rose to a position within Croatia's national oil company INA.[1] After he fell out with the country's regime he emigrated to West Germany in 1982 where he became involved with the Croatian National Committee.[1] Together with Ivan Botić he published Yugoslavia in crisis, in which the two argued that Yugoslavia's large inflation rate and unemployment was resulting in the exploitation of Croatian resources.[2][3] He was assassinated by UDBA agents in 1983.[1] The assassination was code-named Operation Dunav.[4]

His remains were reburied at Zagreb's Mirogoj cemetery in 1999.[5]

Germany put out an arrest warrant on Josip Perković for his involvement in the assassination in 2005.[6] Krunoslav Prates has also been put on trial on charges relating to the crime.[7]Some Serbian sources have linked his assassination to the Serbian mafia, including later Serb warlord Željko Ražnatović "Arkan".[citation needed] The German court tring Prates has threatened to take action against Croatian officials who have obstructed Croatian testimony at the trial, including Croatian president Stipe Mesić.[8]

In 2008 Krunoslav Prates as sentenced to life in prison for his role in the murder.[9] In 2009, the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany issued warrants for Zdravko Mustač, Josip Perković, Ivan Cetinić, Ivan Lasić and Boris Brnelić for their involvement in the murder as members of the UDBA.[10] In October 2009 German police arrested Luka Sekula, a Croat with Swedish citizenship, for participation in the murder.[11][12]

UDBA
References
↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Dossier: Slučaj Perković ili tko su hrvatski obavještajci - 24sata
↑ Yugoslavia in crisis
↑ Stjepan Gabriel Meštrović, Miroslav Goreta, Slaven Letica; The Road from paradise: prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe. University Press of Kentucky, 1993. (p. 77)
↑ In Germany, suspect in Đureković's killing was captured
↑ Đureković sentence by Dolanc, Planinc, Spiljak and Ljubicic?
↑ Suspected of being involved in killings of Stjepan Đureković and Ante Đapić, Danas
↑ Prates's trial stopped, Nacional
↑ Vijesti.net - Minhenski sudac prijavit će Mesića zbog uplitanja u Pratesov sudski proces?
↑ Prates life imprisonment for role in Đureković killing
↑ [Tjeralica iz Njemačke za udbašima
↑ U Njemačkoj uhićen bivši jugoslavenski agent zbog ubojstva Stjepana Đurekovića, Slobodna Dalmacija
↑ Udbaš Vinko Sindičić uhićen u Njemačkoj, Slobodna Dalmacija



Does Stjepan Mesic hide UDBA-man Ivan Lasic?






Statement of Herzegovina’s UDBA-man Ivan Lasic about the murder of Stjepan Djurekovic


German judiciary is thinking about raising a bill of indictment against Ivan Lasic, former chief of second department of Udba (sector for emigrations) for helping in Udba’s murders regarding that he is refusing to give statement in lawsuit to Krunoslav Prates.

Recently German investigators were in Mostar where Lasic lived and found that former Udba’s chief had moved to Zagreb.


The investigators got an information that he refuses to give his testimony, although he wrote with his own hand, at the beginning of nineties, a statement to SZUP (aktualy SOA), about his knowledge of murder of Stjepan Djurekovic.


In the statement available to German public prosecutor’s office (and on 45 lines) Lasic abolished himself from responsibility for Djurekovic’s murder, but more or less he charged: Krunoslav Prates, Josip Perkovic, Stanko Colak, Stane Dolanc, Bozo Spasic, Sreten Aleksic, Srdjan Andrejevic and Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan.


Lasic came in Zagreb under tutorship of Croatian secret services with help of Ivan Bandic, present ambassador of Croatia in Hungary and Josip Perkovic, grey eminence of all Croatian spies who engage themselves for his security at Croatian President Stjepan Mesic.


In Germany could be pressed charges against Ivan Lasic, if it is to believe to statements of Tomislav Naletilic:


- Ivan Lasic was the most bloodthirsty. He started as a primary school teacher in village Rasno, and then transported for principal of dormitory in Siroki. For the function he was recruited by economist in the dormitory, Tadija Loncar, later chief of Siroki Brijeg’s UDBA, who recomended him to Stanko Colak. When Stanko Colak in seventies became chief in Belgrade, his brother Drago Colak was a chief of UDBA in Mostar, and third brother Ivan Colak was a chief of Siroki Brijeg service. Lasic and Loncar became leaders of professional killers who were killing our members throughout Germany. Late by the party line joined them Jerko Bradvica.

That was the operative cream of UDBA against Croatian emigration, which planned creating of co-operative net in emigration and organized murders abroad. The job was coordinated with chiefs of Croatian UDBA Josip Perkovic and Zdravko Mustac. They were no fanatic communists. The Lasic and Bradvica family don’t have no communist past. They were, by my opinion, dressed up executors of system who were first in duty to Josip Broz Tito, later in the same way to Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic.

In reality, they were implementing terror and they were above their leaders because the leaders before them were a part of political terror. Motives were personal privileges, getting rich and ability to keep everyone in power under control.

Tomislav Naletilic, Slobodna Bosna, 11 May 2006

If Germany release APB after Lasic, it will be second biggest Udba's catch, with Josip Perkovic, whom Croatian authorities keep from criminal prosecution.



Arkan aka Željko Ražnatović

Early life and problematic start
Ražnatović was born in Brežice, a small town in the Styrian region of southern Slovenia. His father Veljko was a Montenegrin Serb, serving as a high ranking officer in the Yugoslavian air force. Arkan had lived with his mother Slavka, a communist activist, and three older sisters. His parents divorced in his youth. Arkan's father often beat him when he was young, and treated his family harshly as with his army subordinates. As a child Arkan often ran away from home to cause mischief, eventually ending up in a delinquents' institution. He became a petty criminal already in his early teenage years, before graduating to more serious offences as an adult.

In 1972, at the age of twenty, he illegally emigrated to Western Europe, hoping to find respect and fortune through a criminal career. Abroad he met many well-known criminals from Yugoslavia who were later killed. He took his nickname Arkan after a comic strip character. However, the word arcanus in Latin means 'mysterious'. As an armed robber, assailant and murderer he had convictions or warrants in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy. He was imprisoned in Belgium in 1974, escaped in 1977, rearrested in the Netherlands in 1979 but escaped again in 1981. At one point, he was wounded in a clash with police. He fled from dozens of European prisons, including the compound which is today a high security prison for war criminals in the Scheveningen suburb of the Hague. Ražnatović was even on Interpol's ten most wanted list.

In his youth Arkan was a ward of the Slovenian politician Stane Dolanc, his father's friend. Dolanc was chief of the secret police and a close associate of the Yugoslav strongman Josip Broz Tito. Whenever Arkan was in trouble Dolanc helped him as a reward for his services to the Yugoslav secret state police (UDBA). Arkan worked as an undercover agent from 1973, whose job was to carry out assassinations of various terrorists, political emigrants and opponents of the ruling regime.

Arkan was forced to learn the main European languages because of his undercover work in Europe. He spoke fluent English, French and Italian, and was also familiar with German, Swedish and Dutch.

He returned to Serbia in 1981 and continued his criminal career, opening a number of illegal businesses. In November 1983, two federal policemen ambushed Arkan at his house in order to have him arrested and interrogated over some of his activities. He resisted, pulled out his gun and shot and wounded both of them. An intervention from Stane Dolanc effected his release from prison only two days later. This incident increased Arkan's criminal reputation in Belgrade.


Shadow of doubt?

Source: Guardian
(snip)

The former military intelligence officer, Thomas Ash, had been following reports of the case with keen interest. One of his key concerns had been the study of Soviet and east European special forces, and since retiring he has continued to study closely the secret service organisations in the Balkans. Ash quickly reached his own conclusion about the murder: there were, he thought, clear signs of Serbian involvement.

In 1948, Tito and Stalin fell out over the direction of communism, and Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comintern, the international association of pro-Soviet communist parties. The country thus became, as the historian Peter Calvocoressi wrote, "an international anomaly: a communist state dependent on US and other western aid". Although the west gained no discernible advantage from this patronage, the arrangement guaranteed Tito's long-term survival. While the Russians eliminated communists sympathetic to Tito, he in turn had political opponents, even those who had fled abroad, systematically murdered.

"In the Tito era, the police and security forces of certain Nato nations were warned off taking any firm action against the notorious UDBA, the Yugoslav secret service," says Ash."I was told to cool it; we had to leave them alone, we had to keep Tito sweet." The result of this misplaced regard for Tito was an unchecked wave of political assassinations of his opponents wherever they might be, Europe, America, Australia - some 68 between 1960-80. The UDBA became practised at assassinations in foreign countries, and got used to the idea of acting with impunity.

Such absolute freedom led to carelessness. Nikola Stedul, who was living in exile in Kirkcaldy, became a target for Yugoslav agents after becoming president of the Croatian Movement for Statehood. He was shot five times outside his home on October 20 1988. But the operation was badly botched. The surveillance team had not done its work properly. Not only did Stedul survive, but a neighbour had taken the registration number of the gunman's hire car. Vinko Sindicic was arrested later that day at Heathrow airport. He proved to be a Yugoslav "master assassin" who had executed 10 opponents of the state in different countries. He was charged with the attempted murder of Stedul and, in May 1989, found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Determined to learn from such errors, Slobodan Milosevic, who became president of Serbia in 1989, developed his own Serbian-controlled security services, with an assassination department, the Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije (JSO). "The method favoured by the JSO for operations in foreign countries became the carefully-planned approach of an experienced lone assassin," Ash says. "Operating with local support, he would make a cool and precise execution, preferably with one silent shot at very close range. It was essential that he could make his escape without being detected."

From the start of the 1990s, Milosevic pursued his dream of building a greater Serbia from the ruins of the old Yugoslav federation. In doing so, he utilised the talents, such as they were, of Zeljko Raznatovic, the warlord known as Arkan. Arkan, born in Montenegro in 1953, was recruited by the Yugoslav secret service and became its foremost assassin of exiled enemies of the regime. By 1990, there were warrants for his arrest, in connection with a series of bank robberies and murders, in Belgium, Holland, Italy, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland; but, with a copious supply of false passports, he continued to move across international borders with ease. In October 1990, he established his own militia, the Serbia Volunteer Guard, known as the Tigers, who quickly established themselves as efficient killers, held respon sible for massacres in Croatia and Bosnia as they spearheaded the ethnic cleansing in the civil wars of 1991-95. Arkan, enjoying the full patronage of Milosevic, believed himself above the law.

... continues

[Željko Zidarić]

Thursday, 11 February 2010
Studia Croatica

Dr. John R. Schindler - Agents Provocateurs: Terrorism, Espionage, and the Secret Struggle for Yugoslavia, 1945-1990
Interview: Dr. John R. Schindler
Subject: Schindler’s forthcoming book, Agents Provocateurs: Terrorism, Espionage, and the Secret Struggle for Yugoslavia, 1945-1990

1. How did you get idea to write a book about UDBA assassinations?
Back in the 1990s, when I was involved in the hunt for war criminals in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, I was intrigued by the fact that many of the most wanted men – Arkan was the only most famous example of this type – had extensive histories with state security, ie UDBA, under Communism, and many had participated in “special actions” against radical émigrés abroad for Tito. As a counterintelligence officer, I was initially puzzled by how so many thugs could be organized crime members, ie Mafiosi, but also be high-ranking collaborators with UDBA. They all had “VIP” – veza i protekcija. I soon learned that this was entirely intentional, and a perverse outgrowth of the decades-long war waged by Tito’s secret police against the “enemy emigration.” One cannot understand much about the former Yugoslavia since 1991 – murders, corruption, mass killings, assassinations – without understanding how UDBA’s secret struggle against terrorism politicized crime, and criminalized politics. We think of events such as the 2003 murder of Zoran Djindjic as “normal,” but when the prime minister is murdered in broad daylight by assassins who are simultaneously state security officials and organized crime bosses, who have murdered people in several countries – this is not normal, this is the legacy of UDBA, what I call “Tito’s Ghost”.

2. When and how did you for the first time find out about UDBA assassinations, and which case was that?
Like everyone who gets close to UDBA veterans – as President Putin famously said, “There are no former intelligence officers” – I heard the stories, after drinks. Tales of operations against terrorists in Stuttgart or Sydney. Stories about surveillance leading to killings all over the West during the late Cold War. Exciting but very bloody stories, like nothing I had heard before. I didn’t believe it at first, but I was curious, so I started looking into it, part-time, what spies call a “hobby file.” I was astonished to find that much of what the Udbasi said was true. The first case I looked into deeply was the murder of the Croatian dissident Bruno Busic in Paris in October 1978 – a clear-cut UDBA killing. While Busic was very sympathetic to Croatian nationalism, he was no “terrorist” but he was murdered anyway, shot in the head at close range, like most victims of what UDBA called the “black program.” The Busic case also illustrates the double standards in the West regarding UDBA crimes. Only a month before, the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov was assassinated by the Bulgarian secret police in London, the famous “umbrella murder,” which caused outrage in the West. That investigation is still open, British police continue to try and make an arrest, 32 years later. But nobody in the West much cared when Busic was brutally assassinated a few weeks later in Paris. The case has been forgotten. Tito was useful to the West, so UDBA crimes were mostly ignored, even when Yugoslav agents killed abroad, frequently. During the Cold War, UDBA assassinated many more people in the West than the Soviet bloc did, but it has received very little attention – then or since.

3. How much time did you spend on research and collecting material for the book?
I have spent years looking into this matter, but mostly as a “hobby file” – taking notes, talking to people across the region, digging up old newspaper clippings in many languages. It has been a gradual process, getting stories right – and some things will never be fully known, because UDBA was very secretive, and many of those involved have died, often violently. It is hardly a coincidence that many of the UDBA officers and agents most involved in “black actions” are now dead – and they have seldom died in bed.

4. Did you have access to American secret service (CIA, of FBI or others) archive concerning UDBA activities, and did you maybe have access to such archive in other countries?
I have seen some U.S. secret files on these cases during my time with American intelligence. However, those have not been used in the writing of my book, as they are off-limits to researchers. It is important to get the story right, to cut through myths, to be fully accurate, and if a fact cannot be checked, I won’t use it. I am confident that, years from now, when U.S. intelligence files about UDBA are released, they will tell an interesting story that will reinforce my book. Most UDBA files relating to the “special program” were destroyed in the early 1990s when Yugoslavia fell apart. However, some files have come to light in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb and have appeared, and I have used them. In many cases, UDBA was careful to not write much down in the first place, which was good for spies but bad for historians!

5. During your research did you find any common characteristic in UDBA assassinations?
Most UDBA assassinations abroad followed a standard model. Yugoslav agents planted disinformation in émigré circles in the West, to create confusion and in-fighting inside groups. Assassins would conduct surveillance, then kill the target, usually with gunshots at close range. UDBA killings were often very brutal, more brutal than needed to kill. In some cases, victims were killed with knives and stabbed dozens of times. In all cases, UDBA tried to portray killings as the “result of squabbles among émigrés” – a story which Western police and intelligence agencies, which seldom understood Yugoslav émigrés well, often accepted at face value.

6. How many assassinations do you describe in your book, and do you maybe know how many persons UDBA kill abroad overall?
It is difficult to say with absolute certainty, but between the mid-1960s and 1990, UDBA attempted over a hundred assassinations or abductions in the West – heavily West Germany, but all over Western and Central Europe, plus Britain, the USA, Canada, Australia, even South Africa. Wherever there were Yugoslav émigrés, UDBA followed. Over 60 Croats were murdered by UDBA abroad, as well as some Serbs and Albanians – certainly at least 80 confirmed UDBA killings during the late Cold War, all in Western countries friendly to Yugoslavia. There were nearly a dozen murders in the USA alone.

7. Do you know who was responsible in UDBA for abroad operations and most of the assassinations?
In some cases, we can say with a high degree of certainty exactly who approved assassinations and conducted them, because survivors have talked since 1991. In a few cases, paperwork survives. The general pattern is clear. The political leadership, usually at republican level, would request a “special action” against a troublesome émigré – some real terrorists, others not – and the republican UDBA would do the killing, sometimes with help from the Federal UDBA in Belgrade. In other words, most killings of Croats abroad were performed by the Croatian UDBA. In most cases, the actual assassination was performed by an agent with mafia connections, not someone easily tied to the Yugoslav government. In the few cases where assassins were caught by Western police, it was nearly impossible to show their links to UDBA, due to this solid tradecraft.

8. What was, for you, most spectacular case of UDBA assassinations, and why?
There were many cases which were indeed spectacular – the murder of Busic in 1978 was unusually brazen, as was the murder of the Croatian émigré Stjepan Djurekovic in West Germany in 1983, a really bloody and brutal affair. Perhaps UDBA’s most impressive operation was the assassination of the notorious Ustasa Vjekoslav “Maks” Luburic (the commander of Jasenovac during World War II) in Spain in 1969, by Ilija Stanic, who lives in Bosnia today. UDBA patiently infiltrated Stanic into Luburic’s inner circle of Ustasa émigrés, and then killed “Maks” savagely. The most troubling cases, for me, are those where innocent people were murdered by UDBA. In 1972, Tito’s assassins caught up with Stjepan Sevo, a member of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB) in Italy. Sevo was a terrorist, but the assassin gunned down not just Sevo but his entirely innocent wife and his nine-year-old step-daughter, Tatjana. Five years later, in Chicago, an UDBA assassin brutally stabbed to death Dragisa Kasikovic, an extremist Serb émigré, but in the process also murdered his girlfriend’s nine year old daughter, Ivanka Milosevic. I have never heard of any other intelligence service doing such a thing intentionally.

9. How will you shortly describe UDBA organization after your research?
After the fall of Yugoslavia, UDBA disappeared, yet it didn’t. No ex-Yugoslav republic has really come to terms with UDBA crimes at home and abroad, and none of their secret services was cleansed of UDBA operatives with blood on their hands. To cite just one example, witness the indictment of Josip Perkovic by German authorities in 2005 for his role in the 1983 Djurekovic murder – but Perkovic was Tudjman’s right-hand-man on security matters in the early 1990s, and his son Sasa has been a senior advisor to President Mesic! Across ex-Yugoslavia, Udbasi simply became servants of new states and regimes, without many questions being asked. It is clearly in no one’s interest that UDBA crimes be really investigated and solved. For years Croatian authorities half-heartedly tried to prosecute Vinko Sindicic, the most prolific UDBA assassin, probably responsible for more than a dozen murders in the West (he was convicted by British authorities for the 1988 attempted murder of Croatian émigré Nikola Stedul in Scotland, and served a decade in prison), and got nowhere, and Sindicic lives openly in Croatia today. In Serbia, the situation is even worse, and the UDBA infrastructure, the vital nexus of spies and criminals and dirty money, has been only partially dismantled. Milosevic was happy to use it for his own purposes, and few people in Serbia seem to want to know the truth about UDBA crimes.

10. In comparison with secret service like CIA, or Mossad etc., do you think that UDBA was professional, successful and dangerous organization?

In pure espionage terms, UDBA was an outstanding service. It thoroughly defeated the terrorist groups fighting globally to destroy Tito’s Yugoslavia – and we must not forget that despite the fact that UDBA declared all its opponents to be “terrorists” and “war criminals” there really were such groups, and they were real and violent – and did so magnificently. The defeat of the enemy was total, and UDBA successfully cloaked its violent acts in secrecy. The USA has much to learn operationally from UDBA tactics and techniques against terrorism: no service has ever done it better. But the price paid by the peoples of former Yugoslavia for UDBA’s success against terrorism has been enormous. We have UDBA and its methods to thank for the criminalization of politics and police that is endemic across the region, and we have Tito and his spies to thank for creating the likes of Arkan and countless other mass murderers who got their start in UDBA’s “special program.” For anyone who wants to really defeat terrorism, UDBA has shown how – but be careful what you wish for!

Dr. John R. Schindler is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Previously he served for nearly a decade with the super-secret U.S. National Security Agency as an expert in counterintelligence and counterterrorism. He is the author of several books on international security, espionage and terrorism.




Tito's Murder Squads Operated in West Germany

Der Spiegel - Andreas Wassermann

December 9, 2010


Between 1970 and 1989, 22 Croatian exiles were killed in the former West Germany at the behest of the late Yugoslav leader Josip Tito and his country's communist party. Now the German federal prosecutor's office is looking into the crimes, while the interior minister is being asked to strip Tito of the German Order of Merit.

The wooden bar stands to the right of the entrance. Behind it is a shelf containing glasses arranged by size, with wine glasses on top and glasses for schnapps and water at the bottom. Next to the glasses are bottles of Slibowitz, a plum brandy from the Balkans.

For Gojko Bosnjak, a 77-year-old retiree, the bar in the basement of his house on the Croatian resort island of Krk brings back memories of his days working in a bar in Germany. There is even an old jukebox. He created the room to resemble the Karlsburg, the establishment where he used to work as a bartender in the southwestern German city of Karlsruhe. The bar had the Balkan dish Cevapcici on the menu and Croatian exiles among its clientele. "It was an exciting time for Croatians in Germany," says Bosnjak, "but it wasn't exactly safe."

Particularly for him. He opens an album that contains photos of Bosnjak taken 37 years ago, when he had black hair and a muscular build. There are also photos of a pistol, a Beretta with a silencer. It is the weapon with which an informant for Yugoslav intelligence was supposed to shoot him in 1973.

Bosnjak was lucky. The hit man accidentally shot himself in the leg and Bosnjak managed to overpower him. In 1974, a jury court in Karlsruhe sentenced the would-be killer to 10 years in prison. "But the people behind the attempted murder," says Bosnjak, "were never brought to justice."

Dispatching Murderers to Germany
Most of the other cases went the same way. Between 1970 and 1989, 22 Croatian exiles were murdered in Germany alone. Hardly any of the crimes were solved, and even when a killer was brought to justice, the authorities failed to shed light on what was behind the murders. But both survivors and descendents of the victims are convinced that then Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito personally ordered the killings in the West, and that even after his death in 1980, the Communist Party in the Yugoslav republic of Croatia continued to dispatch murderers to Germany. It is a story that has not been fully dealt with to this day.

Bosnjak wants to change that by setting an example. Last week, his attorney wrote a letter to German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, requesting that Tito be posthumously stripped of the highest German honor, the Order of Merit. In 1974, then German President Gustav Heinemann, a member of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), had conferred the medal on the Yugoslav president during a state visit to Germany. "It is the responsibility of Germany and, in particular, present-day Croatia to discover the truth and create justice for the victims," says Mijo Marić. He is the chairman of the Croatian World Congress in Germany, which supports Bosnjak's initiative.

There seems to be a good chance that de Maizière will have to seriously address the petition. To this day, the German federal prosecutor's office still lists 14 defendants in six different investigations into the wave of murders, and six of the defendants are being sought worldwide.

They include two former high-ranking officers in the Croatian intelligence service, who German federal prosecutors believe were the masterminds behind the murders in Germany.

Respected Middleman Between East and West
The cases shed a new light on the policy of détente of the 1970s, particularly on the good relationship between the West German governments of the day and Tito. As a former communist partisan who had fought the Nazis in World War II and severed ties with Moscow in the 1950s, the Yugoslav leader was held in high esteem by the coalition government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats in Bonn. But the West barely noticed the problems in his Balkan state.

As the key figure in the group of non-aligned countries, Tito played the role of a respected middleman between East and West. His relationship with SPD icon Willy Brandt was based on mutual respect, and leftists within the German party were somewhat sympathetic to Tito's Balkan brand of socialism.

At the time, no one was able to -- or wanted to -- recognize that he was also ordering hits on his adversaries in other countries, including Germany. As long as Tito was still alive, "he was the only person issuing the relevant orders," according to a little-known verdict issued by the Munich Higher Regional Court in July 2008. Tito allegedly gave his personal blessing to the hit squads, with the chains of command extending from Tito to the party to the Croatian intelligence service and, finally, to the contract killers.

The Munich trial was the initial result of intensive investigations of the Tito matter by the German federal prosecutor's office, and they are still underway today. The prosecutor's office has already assembled an entire collection of documents and witness statements, all of which show how the Croatian intelligence service operated with recruited informants and killers in West Germany.

One of the men being sought under an international arrest warrant is Josip Perković, who managed agents in Germany beginning in the 1970s. From 1979 to 1986, he headed the "Hostile Emigration" department at the SDS intelligence service in Zagreb, which was responsible for fighting regime opponents in exile. The Yugoslav government was determined to prevent these dissidents from besmirching its reputation and that of Tito in the West. This was Perković's mission, and it eventually contributed to his being named head of the intelligence service in Zagreb.

Shot, then Beaten to Death
The best documentation of Perković's actions against Croatian exiles appears in the investigation of the death of Stjepan Dureković, who was shot and then beaten to death in the Bavarian town of Wolfratshausen in 1983. The 2008 ruling by the Munich Higher Regional Court consists of 118 pages and contains a meticulous reconstruction of the preparations for the hit and the role of the intelligence service under Perković.

Dureković, an executive with the state-owned oil company INA, had fled to Germany in April 1982, taking along book manuscripts critical of the regime, which he intended to publish in Germany. Shortly after his arrival, he established contact with leading members of the Munich exile community. They were happy to welcome him into the fold, promising him assistance with the publication of his books and offering him positions in their organizations. They hoped that the now-exiled former economic official would become a leading force in their community.

But Dureković's new friends also included informants who reported everything back to Zagreb. Perković and his comrades were alarmed by what they were hearing.

According to the Munich verdict, on Dec. 14, 1982, the "Council for the Defense of the Constitutional Order" of the Republic of Croatia, a constituent republic within Yugoslavia, ordered the "liquidation" of Dureković. The "liquidation order" was later "formally confirmed" in the Yugoslav capital Belgrade.

The court is convinced that Perković then ordered one of his agents to make preparations for the murder. Perković had recruited the man in the 1970s and deliberately placed him in the Munich emigrant community, where he had gained the trust of Dureković.

The murder was to be committed at a print shop in Wolfratshausen. The informant had already given Perković the key to the shop during a meeting in Luxembourg in June 1983. The weapons to be used in the killing were also obtained ahead of time in the Balkans. A state-owned Yugoslav shipping company had transported Ceska and Beretta pistols to Munich disguised as an "unsuspicious shipment of goods."

On the night of July 27, the killers took Dureković by surprise in the print ship, where they knew he was going to be. The first shots hit Dureković in the right hand and upper arms. He tried to flee but was hit in the back and collapsed. He was already seriously wounded, but then one of the killers struck Dureković on the head several times with an "item he had brought along, probably a garden slasher." Dureković died a few minutes later, and the perpetrators disappeared without being recognized.

Some 25 years later, the Munich judges were able to come some way to clearing up the murder and even shed light on the political background. But lacking support from present-day Croatia, they were unable to call to account the people who ordered the hit. For the most part, requests to the national authorities for legal assistance came to nothing. Besides, Perković was not about to go to Germany to testify. Before retiring, he was an advisor to the Croatian Defense Ministry, and his son is a security advisor to the president. Zagreb seemed uninterested in any real effort to deal with the case.

But twists and turns of the sort that are perhaps possible only in the Balkans eventually led to a breakthrough. In 2007, an older man named Vinko S. contacted the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigation (LKA). S., who was 64 at the time, appeared at the LKA in a dark suit and tie, spoke polished German and had a lot to say. In fact, he had so much to say and was apparently so convincing that the court treated him like a star witness -- but didn't seem overly troubled by his past. S. was like a character out of a John le Carré spy novel. Using a fake passport, he had infiltrated the Croatian exile community in Germany and passed on information to the Croatian intelligence service. His code name was "Miso" and his contact was Perković. Until the early 1970s, he also served as a confidential informant to the West German domestic intelligence service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

New Testimony
The shadowy figure traveled a lot in Europe. He told the investigators that he had been involved in "sensitive operations." In 1988, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison in Scotland after a conviction for being an accessory to an attempted murder. The victim was a Croatian exile. When S. was released from prison in 1998, he went to Croatia to see his old intelligence colleague Perković. But the old ties were no longer as strong, and the two men had an argument about a large sum of money, reportedly $5 million (€3.7 million).

S. decided to change sides and traveled to Munich to testify. According to the Munich court's verdict, his information was "particularly valuable and authentic," because he "was deeply entrenched in the security apparatus of Yugoslavia/Croatia for decades."

Since then, the German courts no longer doubt that there were political reasons for the Wolfratshausen murder and other killings. The Munich court, according to its verdict, was "convinced that political functionaries in Yugoslavia ordered contract murders that were carried out on the soil of the Federal Republic of Germany."

One of the accomplices was sentenced to life in prison. But another of the presumed murderers could not be apprehended. An international warrant was issued for his arrest, and for that of his employer Perković, but nothing came of it.

This prompted S. to take matters into his own hands and in 2009 he began to search for the agents himself. He finally found another suspect in the Wolfratshausen case in Sweden. S. abducted his fellow Croatian, packed him into the trunk of his car and took him to Germany. He then released the man at the Holledau rest stop near Munich and alerted the Bavarian police at the same time. The man was arrested soon afterwards.

Out of the German Police's Reach
But the effort to deal with the past in Croatian fashion -- the settling of accounts with Tito's men -- ended in failure. The alleged Wolfratshausen perpetrator was later released because the court felt that there was insufficient evidence against him. Instead of the €3,000 reward that had been offered for the capture of the Croatian, S. was served a warrant for kidnapping and extortion. His brief trial, held behind closed doors, ended in a suspended sentence.

Perković, one of Tito's hatchet men, the presumed mastermind behind at least two murderous attacks, is retired and apparently lives openly in a neighborhood of new houses in Zagreb, in a picturesque location on the edge of a forest. The Bavarian LKA lists his address on a website devoted to manhunts, but he remains out of the reach of the German police. Croatia, which is seeking to join the European Union, is not executing the arrest warrant.

"Croatia is protecting individuals being sought by the Bavarian LKA, and in doing so is trampling on the EU's system of values and the rule of law," says Davor Prtenjača. He is the attorney for the would-be victim of Croatian intelligence, Bosnjak, and wrote the petition to strip Tito of the German Order of Merit.

If Germany were to revoke the Order of Merit, he says, it would "increase the pressure on Croatia to finally bring the perpetrators to justice."

[Željko Zidarić]

[Željko Zidarić]

[Željko Zidarić]