PDA

Pogledaj Full Version : David Rivkin - Tudjmanís Spy in the United States



éeljko Zidarić
10th-June-2012, 11:56 PM
Source: Balkan Peace (http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/balkans/croatia/cro07.incl)

Rivkin informed Pasalic of the contents of William Montgomeryís confidential reports to the State Department. This was confirmed by a transcript recently found in the Presidential archives of a conversation dating back to June 21, 1999

David Rivkin, the American attorney who until recently represented Croatia before the Hague Tribunal, was spying for Franjo Tudjman. Rivkin delivered to the late President confidential information and he relayed the contents of confidential docuements which he learned of in Washington . In addition, he informed Tudjman of the contents of what William Montgomery, American ambassador to Croatia , was writing in his confidential reports to the State Department. This was confirmed by a transcript, found in the presidential archives on Pantovcak, of a recorded conversation between Franjo Tudjman and his advisor for internal policy Ivic Pasalic. This conversation was held on June 21, 1999 , and began with Pasalicís verbal report concerning the American delegation which was to visit Dubrovnik and the place where the late American Minister of Commerce Ron Brown was killed in a plane crash. Pasalic actually convinced Tudjman, as the transcript bears witness, to receive this delegation in the Presidential Court, regardless of whether Robert Gelbard was to be a part of the delegation or not. In vaguely promising that Gelbard might be among Tudjmanís guests, Pasalic managed to extort a positive answer from the President. At that point, the advisor stated his desire to be present to witness the signing of a document, likely a pre-contractual agreement, between Croatian Electric and Enron. The conversation then continued on the theme of the Hague Tribunal and Montgomeryís alleged conspiracy against the HDZ regime and Tudjman himself. "David Rivkin was here last week. He claims, Rivkin, this lawyer, he has good connections, especially with the Americans - that according to his information, after all thatís happened, that these in the Hague can no longer attack you directly. But that he is certain that Mrs. Arbour will sign the indictments against our generals before she leaves her post. That this is 90% certain, and that this can be expected in the next three, four, the next three weeks. He returned to his earlier suggestion of raising charges against Milosevic and Serbia before the International Court of Justice. He says that the only way to prevent this, is to go with these charges, with a 90% certainty that this will prevent them from indicting"", said Pasalic. Tudjman cut into his advisorís speech and said: "Call together the Board which deals with the Hague , and then see". "Yes, this is the only thing I consider important", continued the advisor. "He also said that Montgomery is working against us, directly. I have heard from him and from Zdenka Gast that all this surrounding the intelligence material, thathe has orchestrated all this, and that he"because, he says, he had the chance to see the report. He said that I could only tell you - the report that Montgomery wrote to the State Department and there is no doubt that Montgomery is working to destroy us."

Espionage fees

After he convinced Tudjman to dedicate a meeting of the National Security Council (VONS) to this theme, Pasalic concluded their meeting by informing against Drago Krpina, then Chief Secretary for HDZ. He accused Krpina of usurping all of the power in the party, and for going behind Pasalicís back in making decisions, as an act of retaliation for Pasalic not supporting Krpinaís appointment to the post of party secretary. In other words, the transcript from June 21, 1999 finally fully explains the enigma surrounding Rivkin; why the Republic of Croatia under the HDZ government never signed any normal contracts and why his price tag of 10 million dollars was declared a state secret. It is completely logical that spies are not paid according to official attorney rates and that the users of such services do not sign formal contracts with their spies. From the transcript it is further evident that Rivkin is a liar. When Nacional published an article over a year ago concerning his ties to Enron, Zdenka Gast and Ivic Pasalic, Rivkin denied everything, claiming among other things, that he barely knew Pasalic. This transcript proves that exactly the opposite was true, and that Pasalic was the first person to whom he relayed that contents of Montgomery ís reports to the American administration. The transcript also proves that Rivkin was much more successful at spying in his own country than in the Hague . Even though he stated that Louise Arbourís last mission prior to leaving her post as Chief Prosecutor would be to lift indictments against Croatian generals, those indictments still have not been made today, one year later. It is worthwhile noting that Rivkin had been frightening Tudjman with these indictments since 1997. Manipulating the phobias and unclear conscience of the power-hungry, sick and old President, the American attorney even succeeded in capitalizing on the fact that his allegedly reliable intelligence prediction never came true: he managed to convince Tudjman that the indictments were ready to be filed and that he personally had prevented this, partly due to his legal intelligence, partly due to his political connections in the prosecution of the ICTY. And, of course, he charged heavily for this service. The truth is somewhat different. In the case of the Hague subpoena against the Republic of Croatia, the local legal experts did much more than Rivkin in bringing about the victory over the mandatory warrant by the prosecution for state documents to be handed over and for the testimony of Gojko Susak. And when he convinced the HDZ government to raise charges of genocide against Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice, for example, he had no idea of the principles of its functioning. According to the minutes of a meeting of the governmentís Committee for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal from November 1998, the local legal experts had to patiently explain to Rivkin that they first had to determine whether or not Yugoslavia was a signatory to the Convention on Genocide and whether Yugoslavia recognized the authority of the international institution. If not, then it would be impossible to raise charges. From the minutes, it can be clearly seen that Rivkin at that moment had heard of the Convention on Genocide and for the logic of arbitration court for the first time. Nonetheless, Rivkin charged his client for both the subpoena and his ideas concerning the International Court of Justice.

Rivkinís Practical Goals

If it is clear from this that Rivkinís legal services, at least in Tudjmanís eyes, served to cover up his espionage activities in Croatiaís favour, then there still remains the question as to whether it was worth spending ten million dollars for the information that Montgomery was sending in negative reports on the HDZ dictatorship. Even without Rivkinís peering into Montgomery ís reports to the State Department, the whole of Croatia knew that the American ambassador in Zagreb did not have a particularly positive opinion of Franjo Tudjman and his style of governing. The Americans, used to having strong presidents, got about much easier in the Balkan nation with one main leader. However, the untouchable Tudjman, with his imperial ambitions towards BiH, interfered in their plans for the peaceful reintegration of that nation. Of course Montgomery sent Washington unfavorable reports on the Croatian situation: positive reports would not have been truthful. Therefore, Rivkinís role as a Croatian spy in the United States could have fascinated only Franjo Tudjman, who saw this as a great intelligence defeat over the espionage world power. On Rivkinís side, defaming Montgomery had a very practical goal. He had promised Tudjman that with his lobbying connections as a political activist for the Republican Party, he would arrange a meeting for Tudjman with President Bill Clinton. Retelling the contents of Montgomery ís reports served as a cover up for his unfulfilled promises, as well as for the money paid by Croatia for unsuccessful lobbying. It is understandable that Zdenka Gast, presented to the domestic public as the greatest lobbyist for Croatia in the US , helped the American attorney wholeheartedly to that effect. Enron was a client of Rivkinís then legal firm, and whether or not Zdenka Gast would become the head of his office in Croatia depended on Enronís investment into the power plant Jertovec. Otherwise opposed to foreign investments and investors if they were not Croatian returnees from the diaspora, Tudjman this time personally supported the American firm. This was partly a reward for his favorite spy, Hague representative and lobbyist, and partly due to the urgings of Ivic Pasalic, who knew very well the Presidentís weaknesses and psychological limitations. Clinton would have certainly met with Tudjman had Montgomery not sent his government the ugly political diagnosis concerning the Croatian President - this was the message Rivkin gave in informing against his own ambassador.

Center of the Conspiracy

Tudjman was so proud of his "wooing" of Rivkin that on one occasion he called him his "own intelligence source in international circles". This was at the opening of the Croatian Military School . Frightened, angry and set against the Hague Tribunal, Tudjman held a speech in which he, calling upon a "great intelligence source", informed those present that the prosecutors in the Hague were preparing indictments against five or six generals. Tudjmanís advisor Ivic Pasalic, however - as can be seen in the transcripts from June 21, 1999 - used Rivkin for his political battles against his faction rivals within HDZ. Referring to the opinions of the American attorney and his friend Zdenka Gast, Pasalic convinced the Croatian President that Montgomery was the center of a conspiracy set to destroy the HDZ regime which also included the participation of Nacional; former Chief of the Presidentís cabinet, Hrvoje Sarinic; and former head of HIS, Miroslav Separovic. "When we are talking about Nacional", continued Pasalic in his story about the secret reports in the State Department, "I think that it is imperative that you call together VONS or SONS, if you have the will and the energy. Because this is a part of direct instruction. This is an aggression on the agencies like this one and on "" "Who, who?", asked the President, obviously losing the point of Pasalicís ramblings. "I think that this is being directly orchestrated, that itís Montgomery , then thereís Separovic, somewhere in the wings they are coordinating"", concluded Tudjmanís advisor. Both men achieved their goals: For Rivkin the Croatian budget became a golden artery, and for Pasalic, Rivkinís espionage and lobbying strategies, as well as his approach to the ICTY became a never-ending source of arguments for the satanizations and criminalization of his political rivals. VONS and SONS really did investigate Nacional, Sarinic and Separovic, and the more firmly Tudjman believed in the conspiracy by the Hague and Montgomery , the better Rivkin earned.

Rivkin informed Pasalic of the contents of William Montgomeryís confidential reports to the State Department. This was confirmed by a transcript recently found in the Presidential archives of a conversation dating back to June 21, 1999

David Rivkin, the American attorney who until recently represented Croatia before the Hague Tribunal, was spying for Franjo Tudjman. Rivkin delivered to the late President confidential information and he relayed the contents of confidential docuements which he learned of in Washington . In addition, he informed Tudjman of the contents of what William Montgomery, American ambassador to Croatia , was writing in his confidential reports to the State Department. This was confirmed by a transcript, found in the presidential archives on Pantovcak, of a recorded conversation between Franjo Tudjman and his advisor for internal policy Ivic Pasalic. This conversation was held on June 21, 1999 , and began with Pasalicís verbal report concerning the American delegation which was to visit Dubrovnik and the place where the late American Minister of Commerce Ron Brown was killed in a plane crash. Pasalic actually convinced Tudjman, as the transcript bears witness, to receive this delegation in the Presidential Court, regardless of whether Robert Gelbard was to be a part of the delegation or not. In vaguely promising that Gelbard might be among Tudjmanís guests, Pasalic managed to extort a positive answer from the President. At that point, the advisor stated his desire to be present to witness the signing of a document, likely a pre-contractual agreement, between Croatian Electric and Enron. The conversation then continued on the theme of the Hague Tribunal and Montgomeryís alleged conspiracy against the HDZ regime and Tudjman himself. "David Rivkin was here last week. He claims, Rivkin, this lawyer, he has good connections, especially with the Americans - that according to his information, after all thatís happened, that these in the Hague can no longer attack you directly. But that he is certain that Mrs. Arbour will sign the indictments against our generals before she leaves her post. That this is 90% certain, and that this can be expected in the next three, four, the next three weeks. He returned to his earlier suggestion of raising charges against Milosevic and Serbia before the International Court of Justice. He says that the only way to prevent this, is to go with these charges, with a 90% certainty that this will prevent them from indicting"", said Pasalic. Tudjman cut into his advisorís speech and said: "Call together the Board which deals with the Hague , and then see". "Yes, this is the only thing I consider important", continued the advisor. "He also said that Montgomery is working against us, directly. I have heard from him and from Zdenka Gast that all this surrounding the intelligence material, thathe has orchestrated all this, and that he"because, he says, he had the chance to see the report. He said that I could only tell you - the report that Montgomery wrote to the State Department and there is no doubt that Montgomery is working to destroy us."

Espionage fees

After he convinced Tudjman to dedicate a meeting of the National Security Council (VONS) to this theme, Pasalic concluded their meeting by informing against Drago Krpina, then Chief Secretary for HDZ. He accused Krpina of usurping all of the power in the party, and for going behind Pasalicís back in making decisions, as an act of retaliation for Pasalic not supporting Krpinaís appointment to the post of party secretary. In other words, the transcript from June 21, 1999 finally fully explains the enigma surrounding Rivkin; why the Republic of Croatia under the HDZ government never signed any normal contracts and why his price tag of 10 million dollars was declared a state secret. It is completely logical that spies are not paid according to official attorney rates and that the users of such services do not sign formal contracts with their spies. From the transcript it is further evident that Rivkin is a liar. When Nacional published an article over a year ago concerning his ties to Enron, Zdenka Gast and Ivic Pasalic, Rivkin denied everything, claiming among other things, that he barely knew Pasalic. This transcript proves that exactly the opposite was true, and that Pasalic was the first person to whom he relayed that contents of Montgomeryís reports to the American administration. The transcript also proves that Rivkin was much more successful at spying in his own country than in the Hague. Even though he stated that Louise Arbourís last mission prior to leaving her post as Chief Prosecutor would be to lift indictments against Croatian generals, those indictments still have not been made today, one year later. It is worthwhile noting that Rivkin had been frightening Tudjman with these indictments since 1997. Manipulating the phobias and unclear conscience of the power-hungry, sick and old President, the American attorney even succeeded in capitalizing on the fact that his allegedly reliable intelligence prediction never came true: he managed to convince Tudjman that the indictments were ready to be filed and that he personally had prevented this, partly due to his legal intelligence, partly due to his political connections in the prosecution of the ICTY. And, of course, he charged heavily for this service. The truth is somewhat different. In the case of the Hague subpoena against the Republic of Croatia, the local legal experts did much more than Rivkin in bringing about the victory over the mandatory warrant by the prosecution for state documents to be handed over and for the testimony of Gojko Susak. And when he convinced the HDZ government to raise charges of genocide against Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice, for example, he had no idea of the principles of its functioning. According to the minutes of a meeting of the governmentís Committee for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal from November 1998, the local legal experts had to patiently explain to Rivkin that they first had to determine whether or not Yugoslavia was a signatory to the Convention on Genocide and whether Yugoslavia recognized the authority of the international institution. If not, then it would be impossible to raise charges. From the minutes, it can be clearly seen that Rivkin at that moment had heard of the Convention on Genocide and for the logic of arbitration court for the first time. Nonetheless, Rivkin charged his client for both the subpoena and his ideas concerning the International Court of Justice.

Rivkinís Practical Goals

If it is clear from this that Rivkinís legal services, at least in Tudjmanís eyes, served to cover up his espionage activities in Croatiaís favour, then there still remains the question as to whether it was worth spending ten million dollars for the information that Montgomery was sending in negative reports on the HDZ dictatorship. Even without Rivkinís peering into Montgomeryís reports to the State Department, the whole of Croatia knew that the American ambassador in Zagreb did not have a particularly positive opinion of Franjo Tudjman and his style of governing. The Americans, used to having strong presidents, got about much easier in the Balkan nation with one main leader. However, the untouchable Tudjman, with his imperial ambitions towards BiH, interfered in their plans for the peaceful reintegration of that nation. Of course Montgomery sent Washington unfavorable reports on the Croatian situation: positive reports would not have been truthful. Therefore, Rivkinís role as a Croatian spy in the United States could have fascinated only Franjo Tudjman, who saw this as a great intelligence defeat over the espionage world power. On Rivkinís side, defaming Montgomery had a very practical goal. He had promised Tudjman that with his lobbying connections as a political activist for the Republican Party, he would arrange a meeting for Tudjman with President Bill Clinton. Retelling the contents of Montgomeryís reports served as a cover up for his unfulfilled promises, as well as for the money paid by Croatia for unsuccessful lobbying. It is understandable that Zdenka Gast, presented to the domestic public as the greatest lobbyist for Croatia in the US, helped the American attorney wholeheartedly to that effect. Enron was a client of Rivkinís then legal firm, and whether or not Zdenka Gast would become the head of his office in Croatia depended on Enronís investment into the power plant Jertovec. Otherwise opposed to foreign investments and investors if they were not Croatian returnees from the diaspora, Tudjman this time personally supported the American firm. This was partly a reward for his favorite spy, Hague representative and lobbyist, and partly due to the urgings of Ivic Pasalic, who knew very well the Presidentís weaknesses and psychological limitations. Clinton would have certainly met with Tudjman had Montgomery not sent his government the ugly political diagnosis concerning the Croatian President - this was the message Rivkin gave in informing against his own ambassador.

Center of the Conspiracy

Tudjman was so proud of his "wooing" of Rivkin that on one occasion he called him his "own intelligence source in international circles". This was at the opening of the Croatian Military School. Frightened, angry and set against the Hague Tribunal, Tudjman held a speech in which he, calling upon a "great intelligence source", informed those present that the prosecutors in the Hague were preparing indictments against five or six generals. Tudjmanís advisor Ivic Pasalic, however - as can be seen in the transcripts from June 21, 1999 - used Rivkin for his political battles against his faction rivals within HDZ. Referring to the opinions of the American attorney and his friend Zdenka Gast, Pasalic convinced the Croatian President that Montgomery was the center of a conspiracy set to destroy the HDZ regime which also included the participation of Nacional; former Chief of the Presidentís cabinet, Hrvoje Sarinic; and former head of HIS, Miroslav Separovic. "When we are talking about Nacional", continued Pasalic in his story about the secret reports in the State Department, "I think that it is imperative that you call together VONS or SONS, if you have the will and the energy. Because this is a part of direct instruction. This is an aggression on the agencies like this one and on "" "Who, who?", asked the President, obviously losing the point of Pasalicís ramblings. "I think that this is being directly orchestrated, that itís Montgomery, then thereís Separovic, somewhere in the wings they are coordinating"", concluded Tudjmanís advisor. Both men achieved their goals: For Rivkin the Croatian budget became a golden artery, and for Pasalic, Rivkinís espionage and lobbying strategies, as well as his approach to the ICTY became a never-ending source of arguments for the satanizations and criminalization of his political rivals. VONS and SONS really did investigate Nacional, Sarinic and Separovic, and the more firmly Tudjman believed in the conspiracy by the Hague and Montgomery, the better Rivkin earned.

42d3e78f26a4b20d412==